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NSC REVIEW COMPLETED

OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD

WASHINGTON

NATIONAL OPERATIONS PLAN - USSR AND EUROPEAN SATELLITES

(Superseding D-40 and D-45)

References: NSC 162/2 and NSC 158

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SECTION I

THE PROBLEM

1. To examine the structure of Soviet power with particular emphasis on the USSR and its European satellites, to identify its major vulnerabilities, to estimate United States capabilities for exploiting these vulnerabilities, and to develop a realistic program of coordinated operations to further United States and Free World objectives.

SECTION II

POLICY

2. The points listed below set forth United States policy toward the USSR and European satellites, as reflected in NSC 162/2 and NSC 158, which is pertinent for the purposes of this paper.

a. To prevent Soviet aggression and continuing domination of other nations.

b. To discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as effective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of Communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements.

c. To take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, complicate control in the satellites and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc.

d. To nourish resistance to Communist oppression throughout satellite Europe, short of mass rebellion in areas under Soviet military control, and without compromising its spontaneous nature.

e. To undermine satellite puppet authority.

f. To exploit satellite unrest as demonstrable proof that the Soviet empire is beginning to crumble.

g. To take into account the desirability of creating conditions which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more receptive to acceptable negotiated settlements.

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SECTION III

SITUATION

3. The survival of the fundamental values and institutions of the United States is threatened by the formidable power and aggressive policy of the Communist world, led by the USSR, and the prospect of a serious weakening of our economy which may result from the cost of opposing this threat over a sustained period.

4. The international Communist movement is dedicated to a policy of "liberation", calling for the overthrow of all non-Communist governments throughout the world and replacing them with Communist dictatorships responsive to the will of the Kremlin. There is no likelihood that this basic policy will be modified in the foreseeable future.

5. There are characteristics in the Communist system which permit it to act without the restrictions and inhibitions that apply to a democratic system. Utilizing these advantages the Communist empire has, since 1939, expanded by 25 million square miles and enslaved an additional 600 million people. This expansion, if continued, will place more than one-half of the world behind the Iron Curtain within a decade.

6. The enemy has the purpose and capability to pursue his goal of world domination. The record of the Communist offensive clearly demonstrates that aggressive movements of this type do not lend themselves to more than temporary or tactical accommodations. Actually there is no force in being capable of preventing continuance of the

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Communist offensive, in almost any direction. With the prospect of parity in nuclear weapons and the growing industrial might of the Communist empire military deterrents to further expansion of the Communist empire will soon cease to be effective.

7. While there is evidence of widespread dissatisfaction throughout the Communist empire which, as in East Germany, occasionally erupts in demonstrations against the authorities, this unrest at the present time is not on a scale which constitutes a serious threat to the party leadership or presents problems which are beyond the capabilities of the party control apparatus.

8. The Central Communist-Dictatorship has always engaged in a continuous process of consolidation of position and power, as during the Stalin regime the process was characterized by large and bloody purges and the progressive liquidation of possible rivals for the dictators power, and this process is likely to continue.

9. Notwithstanding the formidable nature of the Soviet system and the advantages it possesses, there are certain weaknesses in its armor which invite vigorous exploitation by the United States.

ENEMY STRENGTHS AND VULNERABILITIES

10. The Communist Central Authority has demonstrated the ability to accommodate itself to setbacks, internal disasters, invasion and to survive and grow as a world menace.

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11. The Communist offensive proceeds by covert means; it is, therefore, difficult to estimate the extent of Communist control over nominally free countries until an overt takeover is attempted. The Communists have infiltrated key activities within the United States and other free countries with disastrous results to the national security of these countries.

12. Ideas and concepts favorable to Communist purposes have crept into and have been popularized in the mass media of free nations in ways which have promoted confusion and misunderstanding concerning the true nature of the Communist system and the enormity of the threat which it poses to the non-Communist world. Moreover, international Communism has established elaborate propaganda machinery which floods the Free World with material much of which influences or is unwittingly utilized by mass media to give free publicity to developments and arguments which advance Communist objectives. Publicity of this kind tends to sustain both the widely held but erroneous impression that the Communist Central Authority commands substantial popular support in the non-Communist world and the myth that Communism represents the "wave of the future."

13. The Communists systematically and skillfully, with varying degrees of success, exploit neutralist sentiment and local fears in countries of the Free World to befog issues, minimize the Communist peril, and weaken the national will to survive.

14. The Communist Orbit has insufficiencies in certain key

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strategic items, such as nonferrous metals, precision instruments, electronic devices, and certain machine tools. Although the Free World's trade control program has had an effect in impeding the Communist war potential in such categories that program has not and could not, even if perfectly effective, be expected to have a decisive impact on their military potential.

15. The Communist Central Authority has largely failed in its efforts to sublimate the historical national aspirations in the non-Russian Republics of the USSR and in the satellite states.

16. Past actions and current developments to which the Beria purge may be at least in part related, indicate major tensions both within the multi-national structure of the USSR and in the satellite states which require a continuous effort by the regime to control the nationalist aspirations of these peoples. Both in the satellite states and in the 15 non-Russian Republics of the USSR, Russian personnel to a considerable extent control and sometimes direct the administrative functions of government.

17. The Communist military establishment partakes of the multi-national character outlined in paragraph 16. above and is subject to similar stresses and strains, requiring tight Communist control. This control is exercised by political officers who are not subordinate to military commanders and whose activities are a constant source of friction within the military establishment. Soviet army personnel actually command the armed forces of some of the satellites.

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18. The Communist regime has found it prudent to promise improvements in the living standard of the population in an attempt to dispel passive resistance and dissatisfaction. It appears that greater efforts are to be made to increase production of consumers' goods. Any increase in consumer goods production will entail the diversion of material and manpower from war production and will therefore result in some reduction in the previously planned rate of production.

19. In the satellite countries of Eastern Europe widespread opposition to Communist control has found expression in passive resistance to the economic programs of the regime, particularly in the field of agricultural collectivization and in spontaneous demonstrations against Communist oppression. The most striking manifestations of this unrest since the death of Stalin have been the June 17 uprising in East Germany, acts of sabotage in Communist controlled enterprises, and personal violence against Communist officials. In the USSR the recognition by the new regime of extensive dissatisfaction is reflected in the shifting of key control personnel in most of the non-Russian Republics and the official admission of failures in production programs in the field of agriculture and consumers' goods, with concurrent promises of steps to improve living standards.

20. Communist doctrine calls for the extirpation of religion. In practice, however, religious groups have been tolerated insofar as they have subordinated themselves to complete Communist control and have been prepared to lend themselves to the accomplishment of

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Communist objectives. The Communists have not been able to stamp out religion and it continues, particularly in the satellites, to be a major force in opposition to the consolidating efforts of the Central Authority.

21. The vast majority of the people of the satellite states are anti-Communist and, in large measure, anti-Russian as well. These feelings have been intensified by the oppressive tactics of the control mechanisms which they associate with the Russians. The peoples of the USSR are similarly dissatisfied with and opposed to the system imposed by Communist rule, while the programs of russification have substantially increased anti-Russian feeling in the non-Russian Republics.

22. The majority of the people in the Communist empire long for relief from the all-prevailing police terror and controls, especially the informer system. The whole system of political oppression is attributed by the people to Communist domination and they long for an upheaval, whether by war or by some other means, that will result in its destruction.

23. There are estimated to be between 10 million and 15 million people in slave and corrective labor camps in the USSR. In case of civil disturbance or any situation which might result in breakouts, they constitute a vital threat to all Communist authority wherever they are. In addition, the mass forced transfer of populations, carried out over the years within the USSR by the Communist authority, constitutes a vulnerability and provides a field for exploitation by the Free World.

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24. Communism in practice has created and supports a small elite class whose privileges, rewards, and standard of living are in extreme contrast to the life of the rest of the peoples causing resentment and antagonisms of a major character.

25. The ideological straight-jacket imposed upon Soviet intellectuals, together with their isolation from foreign contact and the requirement that Western culture and scientific achievement be ridiculed and attacked, has undoubtedly caused resentment which could be exploited.

26. Forced collectivization together with subordination of consumers' goods production to rapid expansion of heavy industry has substantially disorganized and weakened the agriculture of the captive European peoples with the result that many of the Eastern European economies which earlier exported foodstuffs are now compelled to import agricultural products.

27. Soviet economic policies toward the satellites seek the complete integration of their economies into that of the Soviet Union, the channeling of foreign trade away from traditional western markets, and the attainment for the orbit of the greatest possible measure of economic self-sufficiency. The result of these policies is the severance of trade ties between the satellites and the West and a sharp decline of the standard of living in the satellites which is gradually sinking to that of the population of the Soviet Union itself.

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UNITED STATES ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES

28. Current military capabilities of the United States backed up by its immense industrial potential are thought to be a deterrent to enemy aggression on a global scale. Therefore, the United States can undertake a vigorous diplomatic offensive and other supporting actions short of war in pursuit of national objectives.

29. President Eisenhower, both as an individual leader and as the symbol of America's enormous power in the service of the cause of human freedom which most of the inhabitants of the Communist empire still regard as their own, constitutes by his prestige and leadership a diplomatic, political, and psychological asset of first importance.

30. United States psychological assets:

a. The United States heritage of the most exciting and attractive political doctrine in history, given concrete application in the development of the American system, has for a century and a half been a source of inspiration to untold millions of people throughout the world.

b. The United States enjoys in general the reputation of having pursued a relatively unselfish foreign policy and of advocating the rights of small nations. In its international efforts to uphold moral principles the United States, despite considerable criticism, is nevertheless recognized generally as a world power which does not abuse its position. A reservoir of goodwill among foreign peoples still exists despite deteriorations which have taken place since 1946.

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c. The United States tradition as a haven for the oppressed and persecuted has in past generations stimulated emigration from every nation of the world to our shores. These immigrants have made their contribution to the building of America and, in turn, have translated their experiences and success back to the Old World.

31. The highly developed facilities of the mass communication media of the Free World lend themselves to extensive utilization in support of policies and programs which will advance United States objectives. Cooperation between the United States and allied countries which engage in propaganda activities directed against the Soviet bloc would improve the quality, consistency and effectiveness of such programs.

32. The United States economic power if directed toward the disruption of the Communist economy, in conjunction with other United States capabilities, could cause serious problems affecting the stability of the empire.

33. The United States can furnish certain support to resistance activities. This current capability could be increased substantially.

34. Many nations of the Free World are associated with the United States in defense arrangements which were motivated primarily by the threat of Communist aggression. These nations are prepared to cooperate to varying degrees with the United States in activities directed against the Soviet regime. Other countries, although not participating in these arrangements, are located on the fringes of

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the Communist Orbit and realize that their future independence is in large measure dependent on the military power of the western alliance.

35. Through the skillful, judicious and full employment of United States economic, political, military and psychological potential, the United States can make substantial advances toward its national objectives short of general hostilities.

SECTION IV

U. S. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

36. To disrupt the Communist Central Authority.

37. To render the control apparatus of the regime ineffective in its control over the people.

38. To foster conditions and create situations which will have the effect of weakening the discipline and will to fight of the Communist armed forces and lead to substantial desertions and disaffections.

39. To reduce the Communist war potential.

40. To exploit every vulnerability of the multi-national structure of the USSR.

41. To undertake and support actions calculated to reestablish the political independence of the Communist subject nations.

42. To subject the puppet regimes of the Communist subject nations to pressures and situations requiring them to make critical decisions which would tend to discredit and undermine their authority.

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43. To stimulate and support nationalism as an anti-Soviet force in the non-Russian Republics of the USSR and in the Eastern European satellites, attempting to channel these forces against the Communist Central Authority.

44. To foster and maintain throughout the Communist empire a firm devotion to the principles of human freedom, individual liberty and faith in the inevitable triumph of freedom over tyranny.

45. To encourage the development of and to support movements and organizations opposed to Communism which can assist in bringing about the removal of the Communist peril and its replacement by governments which will act in conformity with principles set forth by the United Nations.

46. To obtain the maximum possible cooperation from states outside the Soviet Orbit, particularly those on the periphery, in United States supported activities directed against the Soviet power.

SECTION V

OPERATIONAL FACILITIES

47. The accomplishment of the operational objectives set forth in Section IV requires the creation of an inter-agency Working Group for the following purposes:

a. To assure that the necessary detailed operational planning is done by the appropriate agencies.

b. To facilitate coordination of the inter-agency aspects of such detailed plans.

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c. To bring about the phased implementation of the operational plans in such manner as to avoid duplication of effort, avoid cancellation of effects; to provide mutual support by discrete elements in various operational plans and to insure that all elements contribute most effectively to the desired total cumulative impact.

48. All departments and agencies of the United States Government will contribute to the procurement and assembly of information and the provision of operational facilities required for the implementation of projects approved by the Operations Coordinating Board in support of operational objectives stated in Section IV.

SECTION VI

PHASING

49. To have any cumulative impact a plan directed against the Communist empire must operate over a period of years. Because of the transient nature of some enemy vulnerabilities the exploitation of such vulnerabilities should be undertaken as speedily as capabilities, time and budget permit.

50. To take maximum advantage of variations in Soviet vulnerabilities and to assure flexibility in exploitation, operational planning will be phased on a six-month basis, subject to such modification as may be dictated by changing situations.

51. Such shifts of emphasis as may, from time to time, be required to make this plan and others with which it may be integrated contribute most effectively to the desired total effect, will be determined by the Operations Coordinating Board.

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SECTION VII

GENERAL AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES

52. All agencies now charged with operational responsibilities under PSB D-40 and PSB D-45 will continue the implementation of tasks assigned under those papers until the tasks are completed or the Operations Coordinating Board otherwise directs.

53. Upon approval of this paper and allocation of responsibilities within the Working Group, each member agency of the Operations Coordinating Board will proceed to develop operational plans and implement them to the extent of its capabilities. Such plans and implementing actions will be integrated with those of other agencies through the mechanism outlined in Section V.

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OPERATIONAL ANNEX

(For first six month phasing period)

Plans of member agencies of the Operations Coordinating Board, developed in accordance with provisions of paragraph 53, will include among other undertakings and tasks the following:

1. Undertake negotiations with non-Communist states on the Soviet periphery in an effort to develop a cooperative attitude on their part toward United States supported activities directed against the Soviet bloc.

2. Develop new and augment present facilities for employing a substantial portion of the mass media of the Free World against the Communist Central Authority.


3. Undertake research and development directed toward devising new cold war techniques and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of those now available.

4. To confront the Communist Central Authority and satellite governments with difficult choices on issues likely to create friction.



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6. Develop a program to decrease, through skillful flexibility in applying East-West trade controls, the political and economic unity of the Soviet bloc.



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10. For trading purposes, in connection with negotiations concerning access to West Berlin, undertake to obtain cession of a land corridor with United States controlled air space above, on the ad caelum theory.

11. Take the necessary steps to make the United Nations Slave Labor Report available for publication.

12. Take the necessary steps to make the record of the United Nations Genocide hearings available for publication.

13. Continue to exploit in the United Nations any opportunity to discredit the Soviet leadership and to marshal support for United States policies and objectives.

14. Introduce into the language courses and other programs carried by United States military broadcasting networks, material which will have psychological warfare effect because of the large Communist listening audience this network reaches.

15. Foster in the minds of the individuals in control of the Communist World, as well as the people within the Communist Orbit, the

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idea of United States military and economic power under a firm, intelligent leadership.



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19. With a view to systematic propaganda exploitation, continue to advocate free elections in the satellites and their future association with the Western European community with emphasis on economic cooperation and rehabilitation after liberation occurs.

20. Subject Soviet intellectuals through all available media, to appeals and arguments and to such pressures as can be exerted, seeking to orient their loyalties toward the Free World.

22. Stimulate and exploit division within the Communist ruling groups in each satellite.

23. Make available the surplus food stocks in the United States to the hungry populations of the satellite states in such a way as to


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derive maximum benefit to the interests of the United States.



25. Build up stockpiles of necessary supplies and equipment to permit the rapid launching of balloon operations when opportunity offers.



28. Create and take full advantage of situations permitting the timely demonstration of United States and allied military power as the defender of freedom and peace.

29. Take steps to intensify national tensions within the Communist empire, seeking to direct their force against the Communist Central Authority, and associate appropriate segments of the Free World with the national aspirations of the enslaved people.

30. Exploit the multi-national character of the Communist military establishment, the friction between political officers and military commanders in such manner as to weaken discipline and the will to fight and to cause substantial desertions and disaffection.

31. Undertake projects directed toward impeding scientific progress in the USSR.

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32. Formulate a program specifically dedicated to developing a solidarity of interests and purposes between resistance elements in the satellites and those in the USSR.

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